The Great Lakes Journal of Undergraduate History
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 2

10-9-2017

The Italian Army in the Second World War: A Historiographical
Analysis
Simon Gonsalves
Wilfred Laurier University, simon.gonsalves95@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/gljuh
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Gonsalves, Simon (2017) "The Italian Army in the Second World War: A Historiographical Analysis," The
Great Lakes Journal of Undergraduate History: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/gljuh/vol5/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate History Collections at Scholarship at
UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Great Lakes Journal of Undergraduate History by an authorized
editor of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Gonsalves 3

The Italian Army in the Second World War: A
Historiographical Analysis
Simon Gonsalves
Wilfred Laurier University
Abstract
Classical English language analysis of Italy's role in the Second
World War has done poorly in its attempt to accurately the Italian
military's contribution to the Axis cause. Basing their analysis on
flawed sources, historians in the intermediate post war era got much
incorrect. Many of the staples of the World War Two genre still base
much of their writing on these writers. This paper concludes by
exploring the two most important modern writers who specialize in
this area of military history.
Keywords: Italy, World War Two, Historiography, Twentieth century
history
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W

inston Churchill, British Prime Minister, legendary wartime

leader, and admired historian was well known by his fellow politicians
in the House of Commons for his clever wit and snappy retorts.
During a prewar diplomatic conference, with the looming storm
clouds of war on the horizon, Churchill sat across from Germany’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs - Joachim von Ribbentrop. Brimming with
confidence, Ribbentrop proclaimed that in the event of war with
Britain, the Italians would be a steadfast German ally. Churchill
responded with one of his characteristic verbal ripostes; “That’s only
fair – we had them last time.”1
Churchill was of course referring to Italy’s notoriously poor military
performance in the First World War. Almost a century has passed
since Churchill made his famous remark, and to this day opinion has
hardly shifted on the subject. A comical example of the enduring
popularity of this perception is the first result of an online image search
of the Italian Navy – a pizza floating lamely in the ocean. Throughout
the vast academic literature concerning the Second World War, Italy’s
support for the Axis cause has long been either ignored,
misinterpreted, or simply dismissed as irrelevant. The Simon and
Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II goes as far as to title the
notable 1940 conflict between Greece and Italy under "Balkans,
German Invasion of."2
Italy’s role in the Second World War has often been reduced to mere
footnotes, though Italy’s armed forces participated in some of the most
heavily contested theatres of the war, such as the North and East
Africa, the U.S.S.R., Greece, the Balkans, and France. Italy’s early
surrender and factional re-alignment during the war stands in stark
contrast to Nazi Germany’s unforgiving struggle to the last magazine
- climaxing at the grim last stand at Berlin, and Imperial Japan’s
1

Crawford, Five Minutes in Berlin. (Edinburgh: Murry McLellen, 2015.)
Digital Edition: https://books.google.ca/ books?id=L8waCwAAQBAJ&pg.
2
James Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 19401941. The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 4 (1994), 620.
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fanatical resistance across the Pacific. Historians of the Second World
War have, more often than not, allowed the plentiful, deeply negative
tropes regarding Italy’s actions during the World War Two to
continually permeate their works.
The objective of this essay is to examine the origin as well as the
substance of these common historical narratives concerning the guerra
fascista (the period between 1939 and 1943) which have circulated in
academia and popular culture since the country’s ignoble exit from the
Second World War. Furthermore, it aims to document the fascinating
historiographic debate in English language literature regarding the
source of Fascist Italy’s military failures from 1940 to 1943. Since the
army was the most important service, as it possessed the most financial
and political power, it will be the centre of analysis.
Historical Context
During the scramble for Africa, Italy was the only European state to
have its colonial ambitions in Africa dashed on the field of battle by a
non-European state. Driven out of Ethiopia in 1895, the country’s
participation in the First World War was equally catastrophic.3
Stalemated by the Austro-Hungarian army for years, the furthest
Italian advance was only ten miles into Austrian territory.4 The Italian
Army was routed by the German offensive at Caporetto in 1917, where
the considerably outnumbered Central Powers took approximately
300,000 prisoners.5 In the interwar period, Italy’s Imperial ambitions
led to the invasion of a series of nations far weaker and significantly
less developed than themselves. While these proved ultimately
successful for Italy, they did little to repair the reputation of Italy’s
armed forces.

3

Vandervort, Bruce. Wars of imperial conquest in Africa, 1830-1914.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 43.
4
John, Gooch. The Italian Army and the First World War (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3.
5
Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World War, 4.
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It was Italy’s participation in the Second World War that shaped
contemporary perceptions of the Italian military the most. The results
of Italian foreign policy between the years of 1940 and 1943 are almost
uniformly perceived as dismal. Declaring war on the Allied powers in
the summer of 1940, the Italian Fascist Benito Mussolini unleashed his
country’s military with the ambition to become a Roman Empire of
the 20th century. The Italian strongman aimed to conquer the
Mediterranean and “make Italy a world power with an empire from
Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf.”6 The successful prosecution of the war
was vital to the regime’s continued existence.
After the German Reich’s invasion of Poland, Mussolini was pressured
to stay out of the war. However, in the summer of 1940, the situation
changed. With French collapse, British vulnerability, and Germany
triumphant, a window of opportunity for Mussolini appeared to have
opened. However, military stockpiles were still largely depleted
because of Italy’s involvement in in the Spanish Civil War.7 Italy
decided to enter a war that, by its own admission, it was not prepared
to fight until at least 1943.8 Within six months, Mussolini’s grand vision
had burned to ashes around him. His most significant conquest turned
out to be a “dusty and useless corner of Africa – British Somaliland.”9
By the beginning of 1941, the Italian military “faced defeat in the
Balkans at the hands of Greece, the loss of the entirety of Italian
territory in Africa to the British, as well as total defeat at sea.”10 The
German dictator Adolf Hitler snidely commented that the unfolding
catastrophe “has had the healthy effect of once more compressing

6
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Italian claims to within the natural boundaries of Italian
competency.”11
During the next two years, Italy hardly fared any better, driving the
Italians from Africa, Anglo-American forces landed on the beaches of
Sicily in 1943. Once news of the Allied landings reached Rome, the
“regime crumbled without any real resistance.”12 Many German
officers still smoldered from Italy’s ‘defection’ from the Central
Powers to the Allied Entente in 1915.13
When the new Italian
government changed allegiances to the Allied cause, vengeful German
divisions rushed to occupy the country. This important change of
loyalty had apparently not reached all the troops on the ground. When
German units arrived to disarm the country’s military, it came as a
shock for much of the army and organized resistance collapsed and
never re-organized.14 In fact, Wehrmacht forces managed to hold
much of the northern areas of the country until the very last days of
the war.
The Myths of the Immediate Post War Period
There is no doubt amongst historians, strategists, and political
scientists that Fascist Italy lost the Second World War, despite
abandoning, and subsequently declaring war on Germany in 1943.
However, while there is clear consensus over the outcomes of the
various battles and campaigns, the explanations for why the war went
the way it did for Italy have been argued relentlessly through the years.
Historical narratives constructed shortly after the war became
incredibly influential. One of the most prevalent historiographical
tropes was that the policies implemented by the Fascist government
were principally responsible for Italy’s military downfall. In the years
following the war, central figures in the Italian military establishment
sought to shape the narrative surrounding the calamitous war years. In
Know. Hitler’s Italian Allies. 18.
Know, Hitler’s Italian Allies. 20.
13
Correlli Barnett, World War Two Encyclopedia. (Westport: H.S. Stuttman
Publishers, 1978), 262.
14
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 21.
11
12
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an attempt to defend their legacies, honour, and self-interest, they
sought to place the lion’s share of the blame on a man few would
publicly defend: Mussolini. Therefore, Mussolini and his fascist
principles provided a practical scapegoat for Italians looking towards
future employment within Allied dominated Italy. This is why “it is
relatively easy to find Italian memoirs that are sharply critical of
opposing figures.”15 Disassociating themselves from the regime’s most
divisive actions, the country’s surviving political figures deflected
charges of Italian incompetence and criminality during the war’s
prosecution towards a figure and ideology already demonized by the
Allied powers. Personal responsibility for failure among the surviving
military elite was thus mitigated, and the potentialities of criminal trials
were also avoided.
The first histories of the war were the personal accounts of the men
who fought in the war. While unquestionably an important part of
historical study, war memoirs are typically imbued with a normative
agenda and should be viewed with caution and a critical eye. Taking an
individual’s recounting of events as definitive has significant
historiographical dangers. This tendency becomes noticeable in Pietro
Badoglio’s Italy in the Second World War. Translated into English in the
early 1950’s, Badoglio describes his time as Italy’s Chief of Staff during
the first year of the war. It also includes his subsequent experiences,
following his dismissal after the military calamities of 1940, as the
figurehead of the nominal Italian government in exile. Badoglio’s 1948
book was a character assassination of the Fascist leader. Mussolini was
described as a military amateur who constantly meddled in the affairs
of professional military men. In an effort to project his own personal
failings onto Mussolini, Badoglio branded his former ruler as a
narcissistic, incompetent, warmongering tyrant. Mussolini was labelled
as a man possessing “an overwhelming belief in his own genius… who
believed himself to be immeasurably superior to the rest of
mankind.”16 According to the former general, Mussolini bore sole
responsibility for Italy’s entry into the war. The Duce, and his enabling
15
16

Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941, 635.
Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, 3.
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sycophants, were responsible for Italy’s lack of preparation and the
abysmal prosecution of the conflict. As the British government saw
Badoglio as a strident anti-communist and detached enough from the
Fascist regime, he was never tried for the war crimes committed in
Africa under his watch.17
While Badoglio was not the only Italian to popularize this style of
narrative, his biased work was one of the few Italian accounts
translated into English. This was a consequence of the Cold War, a
conflict that significantly impacted the way Western academics
perceived Italy’s war effort. As the fault line between east and west
ran through a divided Germany, Central Europe would certainly
become a battleground if the Soviet Union and the Western powers
ever went to war. As a ground war between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact appeared ever more likely, Anglo-American military planners
turned to the only people with real combat experience fighting the
Russians; the veterans of the German military. The Wehrmacht spent
much of the war locked in a virtual death grip with the Soviet Red
Army. Coming close to victory over the Soviet Union on multiple
occasions in 1941 and 1942, many architects of future wars were just
as anxious for former German soldiers to pass on the lessons learned
through four and a half years of war of apocalyptic combat.18
Due to America’s desperate need of actionable intelligence on the
Soviet Bloc, war accounts from the German perspective were quickly
translated into English. The Italian outlook, demolished as a significant
power on the continent and discredited by their military fiasco, was of
little interest to the Americans or the British Commonwealth. German
military commanders were given a platform to forge their own
narrative of the war. Due to Cold War tensions, Russian sources were
inaccessible. Lacking the other perspective, Anglo- American
historiography during the post-war era placed far too much trust in the
Effie Pedaliu. “Britain and the ‘Hand-over’ of Italian War Criminals to
Yugoslavia, 1945–48”. Journal of Contemporary History. Vol 9 No 4 (2004),
506.
18
Sadkovich, “Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War
II,” 44.
17
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authority of German primary sources, often echoing their accounts
practically verbatim.19
Numerous German generals used this opportunity to shift much of the
responsibility for the German military’s eventual downfall onto the
Italian armed forces, a military already popularly discredited. The
dominant post-war revisionist narrative to romanticise the German
war effort was largely powered by famous Wehrmacht generals such
as Erich von Manstein, Friedrich von Mellinthin, and Heinz Guderian.
Just as these figures were influential in creating the impressions that
prejudiced the American view of the Eastern Front, the German
perspective was equally important in the way Italy was viewed in
historical accounts published after the war. German writers were
instrumental in popularizing the second major Italian historical
narrative; that the moral inadequacies and “simple cowardice” of the
Italian soldier lost Italy the war. While not always the case, the
argument that Italian “hearts were just not in the war” frequently came
sheathed in the language of race.20
It should come as little surprise that German writers, conditioned to
the overtly racist attitudes of the early twentieth century, would make
great use of racial theory to explain Italian defeats during the war. Even
by the standards of the era, the National Socialist regime was
infamously fond of associating cause and effect with ethnic ancestry.
There is no question that the “Germans looked down on their ally as
racially inferior, and that this view was shared by the major German
figures.21 Siegfried Westphal, Chief of Staff of the German/Italian
Panzer Army in North Africa, considered that the lack of aggressive
spirit among Italians, officers and soldiers alike, was derived from their
'southern tendencies,’ which “made them too emotional and unsteady
Sadkovich, “Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War
II,” 42.
20
Ian Stanley Ord Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 1, The
Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (1954), 336 ; James Sadkovich, “Of
Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa, 1940-1942”. The
International History Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1991), 312.
21
Sadkovich, “Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa”,
311.
19
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to be good soldiers.”22 Kesselring, the overall German commander in
the Mediterranean theatre, stated that the average Italian was not
qualified to even carry a weapon, and was “conceited, saddled with a
vivid imagination which made it difficult for him to tell reality from
fantasy, and easily contented with coffee, cigarettes, and women.”23
German military commanders propagated these myths and stereotypes
in an attempt to salvage their own reputations. According to German
sources, the Italians defending the Don River positions supporting the
German advance into Stalingrad disintegrated because of deficiencies
in Italian courage. Wehrmacht officers later argued that the
unwillingness of the Italian 8th army to hold its ground allowed the
German 6th army to be encircled within the city and annihilated. Italian
mistakes in North Africa, supposedly caused by faint-hearted and
hesitant command decisions, dragged down critical German units that
could have been used decisively elsewhere.24 In short, German
historiography argued that Italian incompetence was rooted in an
inherent biological inferiority and snatched German defeat from the
jaws of victory. German writers during this period argued Italy’s defeat
was continually postponed by the efforts of the audacious Wehrmacht
soldier through his Germanic fighting spirit and leadership. Italy was
saved again and again by the “genial Hitler and his superior German
war machine, which met its own ruin as a result of its generous aid to
its pitiable and ridiculous ally.”25
The Western Allies were receptive to this point of view. Allied press
reports regarding the Italians were trivializing, while portraying the
Germans in a much more frighteningly proficient fashion. British
wartime propaganda consistently highlighted the rout of the Italian 10th
Army in Libya by a numerically inferior British force. From the British
perspective, Italian failure in North Africa demonstrated the lack of
Sadkovich, “Of Myths and Men”, 311.
Sadkovich, “Of Myths and Men”, 312.
24
Sadkovich, “Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941,”
626.
25
Sadkovich, “Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941,”
626.
22
23
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ability among Italy’s leadership, as well as the absence of popular
support for the war among Italian soldiers. After the United States
entered the conflict, this attitude was passed on to the Americans by
Britain.26
This racist understanding of history was parroted by postwar historians
in the first wave of non-biographical works. Writing on the North
African theatre regarding Italian retreat and German intervention,
Kenneth Macksey in 1972 argued that “the British threw out the Italian
Chicken only to let in the German Eagle.”27 British General Sir William
Jackson, writing a few years later, claimed that the defeat of the Italians
on the dunes of the Western Desert in early 1941 opened the way for
“two races of equal fighting quality - the British and German.”28
Considering intense and widespread German anti-Italian prejudice, the
blind acceptance of German sources as an objective source of
information is the most serious flaw of early Anglo American
historiography.
Macgregor Knox - Foundation of Modern Historiography
The historian Macgregor Knox is the author “whose works have most
shaped the views of readers of English on the Italian military.”29 Knox
is considered an expert on both foreign and military policies of both
the Fascist and National Socialist regimes. Having published numerous
articles and books on Second World War Italian military history, Knox
was the first English writer to present a holistic analysis of the Italian
war effort. The writings of Knox have had substantial repercussions
for Italian historiography. Comprehensive modern histories of the
Second World War base their depiction of Italian involvement
primarily on Knox’s research. As this kind of history is the most widely

26

Ian Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in
North Africa. (Ramsbury, England: The Crowood Press, 2003), 61-62.
27
Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts, 286.
28
Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts, 286.
29
James Sadkovich, “Fascist Italy at War”. The International Historical Review,
Vol. 14, No. 3 (1992), 526.
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read, Knox’s influence on both the public at large and military
academia has been colossal.
The works of Macgregor Knox do not simply repeat the myths of a
dictator unilaterally pushing his nation to destruction or a people’s
refusal (or ability) to fight. At the beginning of his book, Hitler’s Italian
Allies, Knox writes that the “Italian dictator’s sovereign fecklessness
and the alleged absence of popular support for the war” are only partial
answers at best. Knox’s acknowledgment of these long-standing tropes
surrounding Italy’s bitter military defeat was an important
historiographical change. Knox was by no means fond of Mussolini:
Mussolini was a “military dilettante.”30 Although clearly controlling the
nation’s foreign policy, Mussolini was “conscious of his own lack of
experience and understandably reluctant to damage his aura of
dictatorial infallibility.”31 Furthermore, Knox argues that the
“restraints under which Mussolini labored” severely constrained his
ability to act unilaterally.32 Mussolini lacked Hitler’s totalitarian control,
and had to compromise with a deeply entrenched establishment:
parliament, monarchy, army, the church, and fascist conservatives.
Limited in his power, he only interfered in matters of military
professionals when the situation demanded it. The Duce was reluctant
to spend his limited political capital infuriating his military. As such, he
tended to let his military establishment handle their own house, by
allowing them to control their own organization, procurement
strategies, and tactical doctrine.33 As detailed later, this would have
serious consequences.
Knox writes that the Italian soldier had two undeniably excellent
qualities; “the willingness to suffer… and (if led with anything
approaching competency) the willingness to fight and die.”34 He
30

Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 7.
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 43.
32
Knox, Common Destiny, 111
33
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 47.
34
“The Italian Armed Forces: 1940 – 3” in Allan Millet and Murray Williamson
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contends that the popular myth, that the Italian soldier considered
World War II “a war not felt” is simply not true.35 Despite the claims
of wartime propaganda, 'cowardice' in the Italian army was no greater
than any other major armed force of the time. Knox notes that Italian
units were “enduring and fatalistically stubborn” and stood and fought
in the vast majority of scenarios. When Italian troops surrendered en
masse it was due to encirclement and faced with certain annihilation,
not cowardice in pitched battle.36
Mussolini’s “strategic megalomania,”37 ideological convictions, and
character flaws effectively tied Italian fortunes to a Third Reich bent
on self-immolation. Knox effectively asserts that Germany’s
instigation of global war by the end of 1941, barring improbable levels
of allied incompetence, “would have destroyed the Fascist regime of
Italy regardless of their level of military or economic effectiveness.”38
After Hitler’s failure to win the broader war in 1941/1942, the conflict
was essentially over. The scientific, demographic, and financial
advantages of the Grand Alliance of Britain, the United States and the
Soviet Union would have certainly crushed the Axis though given
enough time.
Though his foreign policy blunders had ensured his country’s ultimate
defeat, the reason why the Italian army was so remarkably ineffectual
was not Mussolini’s cross to bear alone. Italy still could have
maintained a degree of dignity in its defeat. Knox makes the innovative
argument that Italy’s military humiliation during the Second World
War was “first and foremost a failure of Italy’s military culture and
military institutions.”39 The troubles of the Italian war effort had
longstanding structural roots within the Italian state that can be traced
back to its unification in the 1870’s. Comparable flaws were apparent

“The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3”, 143
“The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3”, 141.
37
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 1.
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Know, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 2.
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35
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in the Italian “North and South, Left and Right, workers, industrialists,
and generals.”40
Eschewing racial justifications, Knox uses a cultural lens to explain the
disastrous results of Italy’s war. According to Knox’s analysis, the most
significant of Italian cultural inadequacies was the enduring resistance
to modernity that reached across Italian society. The pervasive
narrowmindedness was a widespread cultural trait of mistrust, dividing
the nation by language, geography, and social class. Furthermore, there
was an ingrained and “fierce resistance to precision and rationale
planning.”41 Knox argues that these cultural factors created a society
short on common trust, collaboration, and natural teamwork. In the
campaign against British Somaliland, Italian command staff sought to
use inter-personal rivalries to their advantage. By placing feuding
officers in adjacent attack sectors, they would “put the wind under
their feet.”42 To the surprise of the staff officers involved, both
commanders “concentrated essentially on preventing the other from
getting there first.”43 Moreover, inter- service rivalries were endemic.
Each branch of the military controlled weapons development and
production completely independent of one another, and kept
cooperation at the bare minimum.44 Tactical integration was no better.
There was underlying fear across the Italian military of losing power
through apparent subordination to another branch. Without any kind
of doctrinal framework or cooperation between ground and air forces,
the Italian army’s ability execute offensive operations was effectively
hamstrung. As each arm planned their operations independently, the
army was deprived of the tactical advantages of close air support.45 This
development stood in juxtaposition to the Wehrmacht which had
mastered cooperation between the service branches and achieved
considerable success.

Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 29
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 28.
42
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Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 157.
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Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 38.
45
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Some of the problems could never have been fully mitigated. Italy
lacked a large industrial sector. Still largely agrarian, the country’s
output was only a fraction of that of its German ally and the smallest
of the major industrialized states.46 Italy suffered from a lack raw war
materials, a situation made worse by the British naval blockade. Even
considering these factors, the regime “failed miserably in mobilizing
the nation’s resources.”47 An influx of raw materials would not have
changed the deeply flawed organizational/ideological structure of the
Italian military nor its industrial base.
Italy lacked a well-developed national military culture and tradition.
Combined with a lack of national unity, “the absence of altruism in the
service of higher national purposes”48 created a highly dysfunctional
military procurement system. This justifies why industrialists involved
in the armaments industry happily swindled the national war effort
through “illegal cartels and all manners of deceptive practices.”49 As
leading manufacturers consistently threatened to instigate labour
unrest and production stoppages, the Army accepted the continued
production of ineffective or useless weapons in fear “of ending up with
no weapons at all.”50 In addition, due to a “culture of stubborn and
parochial backwardness,” Italian manufacturers failed to update their
production and quality control techniques.51 Clinging to old models of
skilled workers “slowly hand crafting obsolete weapons,” they refused
to adopt standardized models in mass production lines that allowed
the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Germany to produce much more
efficiently than Italian Industry.52 Crippled by self-inflicted injuries,
Italy could not produce the large quantities of modern war material
that was desperately needed.

46
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Italy’s military elite proved “wholly unable to imagine modern
warfare,” let alone prepare and fight battles that depended on using
mechanized, combined arms tactics. 53 Instead of accepting that war
had now become a contest of machines, the Italian army’s conservative
and rigid leadership placed its faith in mass formations of infantry.
Numerically enlarged the army to the largest possible size, “Italy’s eight
million bayonets” would overcome all resistance.54 However, in the
maelstrom of modern warfare “superiority in numbers tended only to
produce superior numbers of maimed, missing, killed, and captured.”55
This attitude also influenced the army’s force organization and
equipment procurement. Most of the nation’s resources went toward
basic infantry equipment for the inflated mass of manpower, while
critical up-to-date war machines were given low priority as “innovation
remained suspect” throughout the army.56 Italy thus went into North
Africa lacking sufficient armored units and mobile infantry. The
mobility and firepower that was critical to success in desert warfare
was nowhere to found.
An insightful report was compiled by Italian intelligence on the nature
of the German blitzkrieg, or ‘lightning war.’ This approach to
mechanized warfare proved extraordinarily successful in the early years
of the war. Badoglio, the army chief of staff, responded to this
information by dismissively stating that “we’ll study it when the war is
over.”57 The proud ignorance of the Italian general staff prevented the
embracement of more effective approaches to warfare that
handicapped the army in the field. In addition, the dominant military
culture was one that emphasized mind over matter. Marshall Graziani,
Italy’s 1940 North African theatre commander, boldly stated that
“when the cannon sounds, everything will fall into place.”58 There was
a “widespread assumption that in battle, intuition and individual valor
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, Intro.
Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 162.
55
Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 162.
56
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 47.
57
Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 154.
58
Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 171.
53
54
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counted for more than training.”59 It should come as no surprise that
there was little emphasis on training the reservists and conscripts that
formed the vast bulk of the army.
A smaller, more effectively trained, equipped, and mobile army could
have taken advantage of the dismal allied situation of 1940/41 by using
all of Italy’s might in a short, aggressive campaign. Unfortunately, deep
flaws in Italy’s military culture strangled any attempt to build a force
composition that harmonized with Italian strengths and strategic
objectives. Structural issues in the Italian military culture caused the
Italian military industrial complex to produce the “least effective, least
numerous, and most overpriced weapons of the Second World War.”60
The ethos of the military and the country as a whole led to the
deployment of a military thoroughly technologically backward.
Knox finds plenty historical exemplars to support this. Italian Infantry
were ordered to engage forces wielding vastly superior weaponry and
equipment. The Italian 8th army, marching into the maw of Operation
Barbarossa, was even issued boots whose soles were made out of
cardboard.61 Italian tankers were sent into battle in obsolete vehicles
that were outclassed in almost every way. The most effective Italian
tank produced in any real quantity, the mechanically unreliable M14,
could hardly dent British Grants and Crusader IIIs. A single hit by an
enemy gun could prove fatal, as thin Italian tank armor “would
sometimes shatter like glass.”62 Tank crews operated without any form
of radio until mid-1941, and the compensated compasses necessary for
effective desert navigation were never issued.63 Air support was equally
poor. The Italian SM85 dive bombers often “proved more dangerous
to their crews then the enemy.”64 The fighters of the Italian air force
were often underpowered, outgunned, and without electronic
navigational aids. Knox states that the most effective machines Italian
59
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industry managed to create were manufactured too late and in too few
numbers to have any noticeable impact.65 This dismal and depressingly
long list is symbolic on Knox’s holistic view on the Italian war effort.
In his military analysis, Knox argues that the fact that the Italian Army
held together as long as it did was remarkable considering the flaws
inherent within its military establishment.
The Revisionist Position
The historian James Sandkovich is one of the more recent historians
to attempt a reimagining of Italy’s role in the Second World War. A
fierce critic of Knox, Sandkovich argues that “Italy's failures have often
been overstated, while Germany's have been understated.”66 When
placed in a wider context, Italy upheld its part of the Axis alliance
whereas the 3rd Reich did not. Sandvovich argues that Italian economy
was an important contributor to the Axis alliance. Italy produced
proportionately similar quantities of weaponry compared to Germany.
Artillery, aircraft, and armored vehicles were manufactured at around
twenty percent of the overall German total; this is similar to the
disparity between the overall economic power of the two countries.67
This is a remarkable achievement, given Italy’s structural economic
problems. In addition, Sandvovich asserts that at the war’s start Italy’s
weapon systems performed at the same level as the weaponry of the
other major powers.68 Italian research and development actually
managed to design some of the war’s best armaments; the Cannone
90/53 canon and the Macchi C.205 fighter being the most impressive.
Even the P.26/40 heavy tank would be a match for most other tanks
of its class. The lack of resources, power, and technical expertise
depressed production. While Sandvovich acknowledges the Italy’s war
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economy was not perfect, the root of the army’s operation and
technological failings were by no means largely self-inflicted.
According to Sandvovich, the economic and tactical doctrines of the
Third Reich were the main cause of Italy’s apparent humiliation.
Germany was almost as unprepared for total war as Italy was in 1939.
The men in charge of fueling the German war economy corrected this
deficit by thoroughly plundering Europe of its military and natural
resources. Italy, cut off from Soviet and American imports by German
declarations of war, desperately needed raw materials to maintain their
war economy. German actions ensured these assets were not
forthcoming. Germany appropriated Italian sources of coal in Poland
and Czechoslovakia, and took the lion’s share of Romanian oil. The
Germans even appropriated most of the assets from Yugoslavia and
Greece, countries supposedly in Italy's sphere of influence.69 German
bad faith was further demonstrated by Hitler’s refusal to honour
accords on economic aid.70
Additionally, Sandvovich stresses that it was actually the Germans who
were disloyal to their ally. Hitler was deeply distrustful of his non
German allies, and once claimed that “every second Italian is either a
traitor or a spy.”71 The Führer would not provide German weaponry
without German soldiers attached to them. Italy, who had sent it finest
vehicles and guns to fight and die in Russia, was in essence abandoned
by Germany.72 Eighty thousand Italians would lose their lives across
the Soviet Union; a figure four times as large as the number of
Germans who died in North Africa. In the theatre where Italy’s
survival was to be determined, German support was kept to the
absolute minimum prevent total collapse.73

69

Sadkovich. Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II,
32.
70
Sadkovich, Fascist Italy at War, 530.
71
Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940 – 3, 161.
72
Sadkovich, Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa,
1940-1942, 290.
73
Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941, 641.

Gonsalves 21
Knox may also have an “an anti-fascist bias”74 that weakens the
strength of his work. Far from the blood thirsty tyrant depicted by
Knox, Sandkovich argues that Mussolini was a victim of German
duplicity as well as a sensible statesman. According to Sandkovich,
Mussolini appears to have signed the Pact of Steel with the objection
to stymie German belligerence. Mussolini went to war in 1940 out of
fear, not stupidity. Worried that a victorious Germany would turn on
Italy for impeding its annexation of Austria and its refusal to enter the
war in 1939, Mussolini acted in an attempt to avoid becoming another
German vassal state. Disgusted with “German political incompetence,
racism, and brutality, and frustrated by his inability to get Hitler to
appreciate the importance of the southern theatre,”75 Mussolini
continually attempted to find a diplomatic resolution to the war. It was
Hitler, not Mussolini, who was the irrational ideologue that continually
backed his ally into corners which he had no chance of escaping.
No doubt the Italian military had its share of errors in judgement.
However, historians caught up in anti-Italian narratives have a
tendency to portray the Italians in the worst possible light while giving
others the benefit of the doubt. Erwin Rommel, head of the German
Afrika Korp, is commonly depicted as “without question, the most
outstanding battlefield commander of the war.”76 On the other hand,
the Italian general Rodolfo Graziani is commonly portrayed as an
“ignoramus”77 When both man retreated before the British rather than
hold isolated, vulnerable positions, Rommel is titled a ‘genius’ while
Graziani is labeled a coward who panicked in the face of adversity.
This double standard can be found throughout accounts of the North
African conflict. Sandkovich argues that in most situations, Italian
commanders made reasonably competent decisions

74

Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941, 618.
Sadkovich, Fascist Italy at War, 530.
76
Williamson, Millet. A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 100.
77
Williamson, Millet. A War to be Won, 292.
75

Gonsalves 22
Conclusion
Although the historiographic debate still rages on, the false narratives
of the post war era have begun to fade away. Contemporary experts
on the Second World War would intensely disagree that it was “more
detrimental for Germany to have Italy as an ally than simply to have
fought her as an enemy.”78 While clearly incapable of fighting a first
class world power by herself, Italy was valuable ally to Hitler. In Bruce
Watson’s history of the North African theatre, he writes that the
British had to shatter “Rommel’s Panzer Armie Afrika – and its
supporting Italian divisions.”79 The phrasing of this statement has it
backwards. From 1940 to mid-1943 Italy - not Germany - was the
primary Axis power in both Africa and the Balkans. Vast amounts of
Anglo-American material and hundreds of thousands of men that
could have been used against Germany instead was devoted to fighting
Italy. Italian assistance held up the Western powers and allowed
Germany to concentrate the majority of its strength on the Eastern
Front. Even after Italy’s surrender, the collaborationist Italian Social
Republic continued the fight for the Axis.
After Italy’s collapse, the Nazi regime was forced to redeploy
significant forces to cover the areas once occupied by the Italian army.
This forced the German forces stationed on the Russian front to be
substantially reduced. By June 1944, there were 52 German divisions
in Italy and the Balkans - about 18.3 per cent of Germany's 285
divisions.80 When the Russians launched their great summer offensives
of 1944, there were simply not enough Germans left to stop them.
Additionally, Allied troops previously held down in North Africa were
redirected to Operation Overlord. Without Italian support, the
Germany Reich's attempt to turn back the Allied advance would prove
pointless.
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Anglo-Saxon historiography not only overlooks the Italian role in the
war, but Germany’s other 'minor' allies as well. The Third Reich’s
survival was dependent on the immense effort made by all of the
nations that fought beside it. Without the combat troops, logistical
support, and occupation forces provided by her allies, Germany could
not have fought for so long in as many theatres as it did. German
“arrogance, indifference, and ineptitude” concerning their allies led to
horrific loss of life. Forty six non-German divisions from Allied Axis
Armies were wiped out at Stalingrad alone.81 Without the contributions
of Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland, Germany’s collapse
would have come much earlier. For a more accurate understanding of
the Second World War, the erroneous historiographic predominance
of Germany must be corrected.
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